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Information is often unequally dispersed among people, and people seek advice from
experts. This dissertation considers three topics related to professional advising and
forecasting.
Chapter 1 and 2 are joint essays with Jooyong Jun. We consider an uninformed
principal wishing to give the best prediction of the true state by hiring informed
experts. The precision of the private signal of each expert is heterogeneous and
unknown to the principal. The principal should decide the compensation scheme
and employment policy. In this situation, screening the precision of each expert is
valuable since it allows the principal to aggregate information efficiently and to make
a clear cut employment policy.
Chapter 1 presents a model in which a principal tries to design the compensation
scheme optimally to screen the type of each expert. Under a Gaussian specification,
it is shown that there exists a payoff function which achieves the first best outcome:
each expert is induced to report honestly on the true state, truthfully revealing his
own type, and is paid only his reservation utility. The optimal contract is a linear
function with respect to the mean squared error to the power of a certain degree.
The result comes from 1) the single crossing property of the linear payoff function,
and 2) the cheap talk feature of the professional advising.
Chapter 2 explores the optimal employment with experts. Assuming Gaussian
noise, the objective function of the principal becomes a function of the sum of types
of employees and is submodular and monotone in the sets of experts. Thus, the pro-
v
duction exhibits decreasing marginal returns. We transform the production function
from a set function to a function on Euclidian space, depending on the current employ-
ment set and the type of an additional employee. The marginal production function
decreases more quickly for higher types than lower ones, as the current employment
set is enlarged.
The property of the optimal employment set depends on the reservation utility.
It is shown that if the reservation utility is proportional to the marginal single pro-
duction, the optimal employment set follows a cut-off property in which experts with
higher precision are employed. In this case, sequential hiring from the highest type
leads to the global optimum.
The chapter also develops a few extensions of the main result. We show that the
cut-off property holds with a general set production function when it is submodular
exhibiting the decreasing curvature property, and the reservation utility is propor-
tional to the marginal single production. We also propose an efficient algorithm to
find the optimal set with a general submodular set function.
Chapter 3 considers forecasting behavior by an expert when the arrival timing
of a new signal is uncertain. The forecaster needs to infer the arrival time since
he does not know whether the information he possesses is new or already reflected
in the predecessors’ forecasts. We analyze the Bayesian updating procedure in this
situation.
Assuming Gaussian noise, it is shown that the optimal forecast depends on the
deviation of the signal from the consensus. This is because, as the signal of the
forecaster moves out from the consensus forecast, the forecaster assigns more weight
to his own signal, believing that it is more likely to be new. This leads to a tendency
towards more extreme forecasts.
The result sheds light on recent empirical studies on a herding or anti-herding
bias. Without resorting to behavioral assumptions or unusual payoff functions, our
vi
model shows that statisticians may observe forecasters placing more weight on private
information rather than the consensus.
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Chapter 1
Getting Advice from Experts: Optimal Contracts
1.1 Introduction
This chapter1 explores mechanisms through which a principal can best elicit infor-
mation from multiple experts. We in particular focus on a contractual situation,
implicitly assuming the information the principal needs to gather is at least partially
specific to him. Two important issues emerge as the principal makes contracts with
multiple experts. Firstly, the principal should consider how to aggregate information
from multiple sources. Secondly, she should determine the wage offer to each expert,
which may depend on the information quality if available.
Efficient information aggregation crucially depends on whether the principal can
screen the precision of information each expert possesses. To see this, consider an
environment in which experts have heterogeneous private signal distributions and
the signal is independently informative of the true state. The heterogeneity reflects
different abilities in processing raw information, analytic technologies, and/or levels
of ‘animal spirits.’
Provided the principal knows the precision of each expert, she can easily aggregate
information from multiple experts by Bayesian updating. Assuming the compensation
scheme is designed so that experts are paid off according to the ex-post accuracy, and
experts have no payoff other than the wage paid by the principal, each expert must
submit the report on the true state at his posterior mean given his available informa-
1This chapter represents jointly work with Jooyong Jun.
1
tion2. Without message pooling, the one-to-one relationship between posterior mean
and private signal allows the principal to discern each expert’s private information.
It follows that the principal’s best prediction on the true state is then the weighted
average of the prior and all private signals, where the weights are determined by the
precision of the signal.
When the precision of each expert’s signal is unknown to the principal, however,
information aggregation cannot be achieved with the simple compensation scheme
described above. A posterior mean is no longer matched to the private signal in
a one-to-one relationship, and the principal would not know the weight she should
assign to the report of each expert. The compensation must be more sophisticated.
It should be designed not only to induce the honest report on the true state but also
to elicit the precision of expert’s report.
Sorting through compensation helps the principal via another channel. When
the information quality of each expert is heterogeneous and the reservation wage
depends on the quality, the principal also needs to decide the wage offer and it would
be beneficial if the wage offer can be contingent on the information quality.
We show, in an environment where the reservation wage is type dependent, that
there exist payoff function(s) in which the true type revelation is implemented and
the honest report on the true state is induced. In addition, the compensation scheme
induces the first-best outcome in the sense that no information rent exceeding the
reservation utility is paid in equilibrium. When the reservation wage is convex in
type, a simple linear payoff function with respect to the mean squared error of the
report on true state achieves the first-best. In the case when the reservation utility
is concave, the optimal payoff function is more complicated but keeps the linearity in
a certain form of performance measure.
2Experts’ payoff other than the wage from the principal, including nonpecuniary or implicit
compensation, may drive shaded or pooled messages on true state. For example, reputation concern
induces experts to shade or pool messages in the model of Ottaviani and Sørenson (2006a, 2006b).
2
The intuition behind this sorting mechanism is straightforward. In the optimal
compensation scheme we propose, the principal asks each expert what his type is. The
optimal contract is designed so that the penalty for the incorrect report is increasing
in type announced. The less accurate expert then incurs more cost when he pretends
to be more accurate type, barring untruthful type revelation. Moreover, due to the
cheap talk feature of the ‘production’ of advice, there is no intrinsic utility or cost
for experts. This implies the virtual surplus is linear in the control variable of the
principal, and the principal makes the information rent arbitrarily small up to the
reservation utility to achieve sorting.
We then propose a game in which the principal achieves not only the efficient in-
formation aggregation but also the optimal employment. In the game, the principal
announces the payoff function which depends on the type, the precision of the private
signal announced by each expert, the report on true state, and the true state to be re-
vealed ex-post. Experts from population then apply for the job (pre-screening stage.)
Among those applicants, the principal decides which experts to hire (employment
stage.) Compensation is paid after the true state is revealed.
This chapter is organized as follows: A brief literature survey follows the intro-
duction. We describe the model and present the optimization problem in the next
section. In section 3, we derive the optimal contract in which honest reporting and
truthful type revelation are achieved and the participation constraint is binding. In
section 4, we propose a game to achieve the optimal employment. Section 5 concludes
and addresses issues for further research.
1.2 Related Literature
The sorting mechanism in the paper is an application of a screening problem under
asymmetric information. For example, Maskin and Riley (1984) address the problem
in the context of an optimal quantity discount by a monopolist. The main difference
3
is that in professional advising, the information asymmetry occurs not only in the
type of each agent but also in the true state which is realized ex-post. Indeed, the
type, or the information quality of each expert is revealed ex-post through the realized
true state and the forecast. The principal, therefore, needs to get messages from each
agent about her type in addition to the forecast on the true state. In a sense, the
model presented here is a hybrid model of screening and moral hazard because the
latter message is often sent after the principal’s employment decision is made.
Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer (1985) is more directly related to our work in the
motivation and the model specification. They examine the compensation problem for
risk-averse portfolio managers whose signal and signal distribution are both private
information. They also derive the compensation scheme which achieves the first best
outcome. It differs from ours in the objective function and the risk attitude. They
assume the utility function of both principal and agents exhibits constant absolute risk
aversion, which makes sense in the context of the delegation of portfolio management.
With risk neutral agents, as in our model, the problem is not well defined since the
portfolio choice position would be extreme. In this sense, the first main result of
this paper is a risk neutral agent version of section 4 in Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer
(1985). The second main theorem is new. While Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer (1985)
derives the first best outcome under some regularity conditions on the reservation
utility, we show it for quite general case by varying the performance measure.3
Crémer and McLean (1985, 1988) study mechanisms in which a principal, or a
seller, extracts full surplus in the context of the independent value auction. In their
model, the valuations of the bidders are correlated and they know this fact. The
seller then designs an auction mechanism in which payments depend on the types
announced by bidders. Under some regularity conditions, the seller can induce each
3Osband (1989) also studies the incentive provision problem for forecasters. The precision of each
forecaster in his model depends on the effort level, so the focus is on the moral hazard problem, not
on the hidden type problem as ours.
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bidder to announce his type truthfully, which results in the full surplus extraction.
The types of experts in our model are also correlated, but they are conditionally
independent. The true state itself, which is assumed to be verifiable ex-post, becomes
a reference point that each expert’s type is measured. Each expert, thus, is induced
to announce his type truthfully without guessing other experts’ type. This allows
us to develop an independent compensation scheme that does not depend on the
type announcements by other experts. Auctions with state-dependent payments are
studied in Hansen (1985), but it deals with very special cases.
Recent literature on professional advisors is based on the cheap talk game model
first introduced by Crawford and Sobel (1982). Departing from partisan bias ex-
ogenously given to the payoff functions, Scharfstein and Stein (1990) explores how
reputation concerns affect the pattern of messages in equilibrium. They show the rep-
utation concern drives experts to herd in a binary model. The model is generalized
in Ottaviani and Sørensen (2006a, 2006b).
The main difference between this paper and the previous literature on professional
advising is twofold. First, we give the principal an active role in determining the
compensation scheme. Secondly, our focus is on efficiency in information aggregation
and employment, not on the strategic bias. To do so, we assume the principal has
no private information, and experts are not concerned the reputation effect of the
current report.
In our model, the information asymmetry is two dimensional: the signal and its
distribution. Except for a few papers, most existing papers on professional advis-
ing assume experts share the common private signal distribution, and asymmetric
information lies only in realized value of their private signal. Avery and Chevalier
(1999), Levy (2004), and Ottaviani and Sørensen (2006a) consider heterogeneous pri-
vate signal distribution but usually the uncertainty is assumed to be symmetric across
the players in the model. Trueman (1994) and section 6 in Ottaviani and Sørensen
5
(2006a) model asymmetric information on signal distribution. The information struc-
ture in this paper is mostly similar to Ottaviani and Sørensen (2006a). Battaglini
(2002) explores a cheap talk game with multi dimensional uncertainty and multiple
referrals, but his results are mainly derived from the orthogonality between uncertain
variables, which is different from our setting.
1.3 Model
An uninformed principal tries to make his best prediction of the true state, for
example the profitability of a project. To get better information, the principal wishes
to hire privately informed agents, who are called ‘experts’ hereafter. Experts are
heterogeneous in the precision of their private signal, which is labeled their type. The
principal designs a game as follows.
The true state x is drawn from a normal distribution with mean µx and variance
1/τx, which is common knowledge. We assume the true state is verifiable and thus
contractible. While the principal has no private information4, expert i ∈ I receives
a conditionally independent private signal si, where I is the set of experts who are
employed.5 The distribution of si is assumed to follow a normal distribution with
mean x and precision τi, or
si = x + εi, εi ∼ N (0, 1/τi) .
The precision, or type, of each expert τi is drawn from the population with dis-
tribution function F on the support of [τ , τ ] ⊂ R+. We assume F is continuously
differentiable so that the probability continuous density function f exists. The prin-
cipal cannot discern the type of each agent, but each expert knows his own type. In
4The assumption of a fully uninformed principal, in addition to that of the payoff being condi-
tioned on the true state, precludes the ‘yesman effect’ in Prendergast (1993).
5We fix the employment set of experts in this chapter, as though the employment decision is
made before the contract and the information aggregation. However, the order may be reversed in
order for the contract to be used as a pre-screening device. The whole recruiting, contracting, and
information aggregation process is discussed in the later section.
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the pre-screening stage, each expert is requested to submit a message on his own type
ti. Once hired, he has to submit a report on the true state, denoted by ri ∈ R for
expert i.6
The principal’s objective is to maximize revenue less payoffs to employed experts.
The revenue function R depends on the principal’s prediction on the true state,
denoted by x̂, and the true state. We assume the revenue is decreasing in the ex-post
error, | x̂ − x |. For example, the revenue can be the negative mean-squared error
where R(x, x̂) ≡ −a(x̂− x)2 for a constant a > 0. In this case, the revenue function
is a decreasing function of the mean squared error.
The only cost for the principal is the wage she pays to the experts, where the
payoff function is denoted by C(ri, ti, x). Note that the payoff does not depend on
other experts’ messages. In other words, we restrict the compensation to be indepen-
dent, which implies that the principal cannot use group incentives to implement the
information revelation and the performance must be evaluated through the absolute
performance basis7.
Experts are assumed to be risk neutral utility maximizers with the identical vNM
utility function u(c) = c. We assume that the only benefit from information provision
is the payoff from the principal. Each expert has a reservation utility which is type-
dependent. Type-dependent reservation utility function u(τ) is assumed to be strictly
6We follow the convention that each expert reports his best prediction, not directly revealing his
private signal. However, reporting the prediction is equivalent to reporting the signal in equilibrium
provided there is no message pooling, which is the case of this paper.
7Relative performance evaluation has been an important issue in contract theory with multi-
agent models. We exclude such evaluation on report for simplicity and tractability of the payoff
function, since we are focusing on the screening procedure. Extant literature in contract theory
find the merits of relative performance evaluation in that it reduces risk-sharing cost as to the
common noise. See Holmstrom (1982). Another branch of literature regarding relative evaluation
studies rank order compensation or tournament. While it has been shown that tournament scheme
can provide approximately the same incentive for agents as the standard contractual form(See,
for example, Green and Stokey (1983)), it is less susceptible to extreme output volatilities. Both
benefits mentioned above are not relevant to the current model. Ottaviani and Sørenson (2006b)
consider forecasting contest, an extreme case of compensation scheme based on relative performance
evaluation, in the context of reputational cheap talk game, but their information structure is different
from ours.
7
increasing and continuously differentiable. Increasing reservation utility is realistic
when the private information is not fully relation-specific. The expert might use the
private information outside of the principal-agent relationship to derive some personal
benefits from it.8










subject to the expert’s problem
(ri, ti) ∈ arg max
r,t
Ex [C(r, t, x) | si, τi]
subject to the participation constraint
Ex [C(ri, ti, x) | si, τi] ≥ u(τi).
In the next section, we begin our analysis with the pre-screening stage.
1.4 Compensation Scheme for Sorting
In this section, we aim at finding a compensation scheme which achieves the first-best.
We ask whether there exists a payoff function C(ri, ti, x) which induces the expert to
report his posterior mean, implements him to message his own type, and further the








Ex [C(r, t, x) | si, τi]
and
8See Jullien(2006) for examples of type-dependent reservation utility and the general solution
in the context of screening problem. Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer (1985) also assume the type
dependent reservation utility.
9We assume the massage related to the true state is the posterior mean of each expert. However,













Note that once the sorting and truthful reporting are implemented, the principal’s
optimal action is straightforward. Provided the revenue R(x̂, x) is decreasing in error
| x̂ − x |, for a fixed I, the best prediction on the true state, x̂∗, is the posterior




i∈I ri(τi + τx)− (|I| − 1)µxτx∑
i∈I τi + τx
.











Our strategy to show existence is as follows. We first restrict to a subclass of
payoff functions. We then solve the standard screening problem within the class and
check whether the participation constraint is binding for all types of expert.
Proposition 1 is our first main result. It states that if the reservation utility
function is non-convex, the first-best outcome is achieved through a payoff function
which is linear in the mean squared error of the report. With the linearity restriction,
the expert with precision τi should solve




−α(t)(r − x)2 + β(t) | si, τi
]
(1.1)
We want to find α(t) and β(t) such that the solution to (1.1) satisfies the conditions
for both honest reporting and truthful type revealing, as well as the participation
constraint. We must therefore have the following conditions:
• Incentive Compatibility for Honest Reporting (ICR)
α(t) ≥ 0. (1.2)
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• Incentive Compatibility for Truthful Type Revelation (ICT)
Given (1.2), the expert with precision τi will solve the following problem:





• Participation Constraint (PC)










+ β(τi) ≥ u(τi). (1.4)
Proposition 1.1: Suppose the reservation utility is convex on the support of τ .
Then, the first-best is strictly implemented through the payoff function within the class
of linear functions in mean squared error. That is, it is the strict best response for
each expert to message his own type and submit his posterior mean, and the payoff is
only his reservation utility if the payoff function is designed to be
C(r, t, x) = −α(t)(r − x)2 + β(t)
where
α(t) = (τx + t)
2u′(t)
and
β(t) = (τx + t)u
′(t) + u(t).
Proof. Let α and β be C2 function on R++.10 Let α(t) ≥ 0 to satisfy (ICR). Define
C(τ, t) be the expected payoff when type τ expert announces that his type is t and
10It is required that α′(t) and β′(t) are right continuous at 0.
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he reports posterior mean honestly. Given (ICR), we have


















The first order condition for (ICT) is then
∀τ ∈ [τ , τ ], − α
′(τ)
τx + τ
+ β′(τ) = 0. (1.5)
To see the second order condition given (IRC) and the first order condition of
(ICT), consider the following formula.
∂C
∂t
(τ, t) = −α′(t) · t− τ
(τx + τ)(τx + t)
, (1.6)
which implies that t = τ is the global maximizer of C(τ, t) for all τ if and only if α(t)
is nondecreasing. We will temporarily ignore (1.6) to solve for the optimal contract
with (1.5), and then check whether the contract satisfies (1.6).
Let c(τ) be the utility of expert type τ at the optimum, so that c(τ) = C(τ, τ) =





which implies that the experts with higher precision are paid more.
























c(τ) = − α(τ)
τx + τ






































subject to the participation constraint







ds ≥ u(τ). (1.10)
We can solve this problem through point-wise minimization. Since the formula in
the bracket of (1.9), the so called virtual cost, is linear in α, the principal can let α(τ)
be the least possible cost c(τ) for all τ . That is, the participation constraint (1.10)
should bind for all τ . Differentiation of the binding participation constraint gives
α(t) = (τx + t)
2u′(t)
and from (1.8),
β(t) = β(τ)− α(τ)
τx + τ
+ (τx + t)u
′(t) + u(t)− u(τ).
Let β(τ) = (τx + τ)u
′(τ) + u(τ) for the participation constraint of the lowest
type to bind. We now solve for α and β to satisfy the first order condition of (ICT)
and binding participation constraint (PC). Finally we need to check the second order
condition, which is equivalent to α monotone nondecreasing. Since
α′(t) = 2(τx + t)u′(t) + (τx + t)2u′′(t),
the second order condition is satisfied provided u is non-concave. This completes the
proof.11
11The result still holds in the case of type-independent reservation utility. Suppose w is the
12
The following examples show how the concave reservation utility function ob-
structs the truthful type revelation.
Example 1.1: Suppose τx = 1 and u(τ) = τ for τ ≥ 0. From Proposition-
1, we have C(r, t, x) = −(1 + t)2(r − x)2 + (1 + 2t), and since (ICR) is satisfied,
Ex [C(r, t, x)] = −(1 + t)2/(1 + τ) + (1 + t). The first order condition gives t = τ and
the second order condition is satisfied.
Suppose now τx = 1 and u(τ) = 1 − 1/(1 + τ)2. Note the concavity of the reser-
vation utility function. If we construct the compensation function with α and β in
Proposition 1, we have
Ex [C(r, t, x)] = − 2









Ex [C(r, t, x)] = − 4




which is positive at t = τ , violating the second order condition.
The result of Proposition 1 holds only for non-concave reservation utility func-
tions. When the reservation function is sufficiently concave, the compensation scheme
derived from the first order condition becomes convex, barring the expert from re-
vealing his own type to maximize compensation. To achieve the first best outcome
constant reservation utility. From (1.7), the participation constraint is binding for the lowest type,
i.e., β(τ)− α(τ)/(τx + τ) = w.














Point-wise minimization gives α(τ) = 0 for all τ and consequently β(t) = w for all τ . That is, the
optimal contract indicates that the principal offers flat wage.
The problem in this case is that the honest reporting and the truthful type revelation are imple-
mented only weakly: experts are indifferent between sending truthful messages and lying. However,
the principal can achieve the first best with arbitrary small cost by setting α(t) to be increasing in
t very slowly but still keeping β(t) = w.
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with a concave reservation utility function, the principal needs to make the compen-
sation function more concave in equilibrium. This can be done by restricting the
expected payoff to be linear in a geometric power of variance. We state this result in
Proposition 2.
Proposition 1.2: Suppose u is a strictly increasing C2 function and the support
of types is bounded, i.e. τ < ∞. Then, there exist p ∈ N such that the compensation
scheme
C(r, t, x) = −α(t)(r − x)2p + β(t)











Proof. Let α and β be C2 functions on R++. Let α(t) ≥ 0 to satisfy (ICR). Then,
the expected payoff for type τ is
Ex [C(r, t, x)] = −α(t)µ2p(τ) + β(t)
where µ2p(τ) is the (2p)’th central moment. Under the Gaussian specification, we
have






The first order condition for (ICT) is
∀τ ∈ [τ , τ ], −α′(τ)µ2p(τ) + β′(τ) = 0 (1.11)
Defining C(τ, t) as in proposition 1, we have
∂C
∂t




which implies that t = τ is the global maximizer of C(τ, t) if and only if α(t) is
nondecreasing.
The expected payoff at the optimum, c(τ), is now c(τ) = C(τ, τ) = −α(τ)µ2p(τ)+
β(τ). From (1.11), we get

























Note that the virtual cost in (1.13) still keeps the linearity in α, which implies the
participation constraint should bind for all τ in the optimal contract, i.e.,
c(τ) = β(τ)− α(τ)µ2p(τ)−
∫ τ
τ
α(s)µ′2p(s)ds = u(τ). (1.14)
Differentiating (1.14) with respect to τ , we get
α(t) = − u
′(t)
µ′2p(t)




The remaining part is to check the second order condition or monotonicity of α.
Since µ′2p(t) = −pL(τx + t)−p−1 < 0 and µ′′2p(t) = −p(−p − 1)L(τx + t)−p−2 where
















Since t is defined on a compact set and u′ and u′′ are continuous, the left side of
(1.15) is bounded. Therefore, for large p, the inequality holds for all t in the support
of τ .
The logic of proposition 2 is as follows. To satisfy the second order condition,
the sorting variable α(t) must be monotone increasing.12 The α(t) derived from the
first order condition is the product of u′(t) and a function of the announced posterior
precision, which we call here h(τx+t). In the proposition, h(τx+t) = M(τx+t)
p+1 for a
constant M . Though h turns out to be increasing and positive, α is not guaranteed to
be monotone increasing for a concave u. The principal, however, can take arbitrarily
large p so that h increases fast enough to cover the effect of decreasing u′(t) so that
the product is monotone increasing. Indeed, for a given reservation utility, we can
find p∗ such that any payoff function with p > p∗ achieves the first best. We present
an example.
Example 1.2: Let τx = 1 and u(τ) = 1 − 1/(1 + τ)2, as in the second case in
example 1. Then, from proposition 2, the expected payoff given honest reporting on
the true state is, in the optimal contract with p = 3,












= 0 ⇒ t = τ
and the second order condition is satisfied since
∂2
∂t2
Ex [C(r, t, x)] = − 2
(1 + t)4
< 0.
12This is indeed equivalent to the supermodularity of the objective function in (t, τ).
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Figure 1.1 shows how the power of the ex-post error affects the expected payoff.
If the compensation is linear in mean squared error (p = 1), the truthful report
t = τ = 1 does not maximize the expected payoff. When the performance measure
is more sensitive to the error, for example with p = 3 in this example, the truthful
report becomes optimal for the expert.










Figure 1.1: Expected Payoffs when p = 1 (right) and p = 3 (left)
The results in this section are interesting from two perspectives. First, sorting
and honest reporting are implemented through a simple linear-form payoff function.
This is because the linear payoff function under honest reporting satisfies the Spence-
Mirrlees condition, or −α(t)/(τx + τ) is supermodular in α and τ . Moreover, it is
supermodular in t and τ provided α is increasing in t. This simplifies the problem
since the second order condition is equivalent to the monotonicity of α.
Another striking result is that the minimal information rent is paid in equilibrium.
This is because, unlike the standard screening problem, the professional advising has a
cheap talk feature in the sense that the sorting variable α does not affect the intrinsic
cost or utility of the expert. This makes the virtual surplus (or virtual cost) linear in
α. Therefore, the principal can fully control the payoff so the participation constraint
is binding for all types of experts.
It is worthwhile noting that this mechanism is not a unique. One may design other
mechanisms that achieve truthful type revelation and honest reporting. In addition,
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we should emphasize the compensation of each expert depends only on each expert’s
own report, not others’. This independent compensation scheme, in conjunction with
the binding participate constraint, is beneficial to the principal because she can design
the employment policy independent of the compensation scheme. We now turn our
focus to the employment stage.
1.5 Optimal Employment
In the previous section, we showed that the principal can elicit each expert’s
precision and induce the honest reporting through a compensation scheme. Those
features do not change when the principal wishes to hire more than one expert, since
the optimal compensation scheme proposed is independent. Each expert would not
care what types of experts he will co-work. Furthermore, since each expert will be
paid at his reservation utility level, he would not concern about whether he will be
hired or not. This implies that once pre-screening is done before the employment
decision is made, the employment policy can be independent of the compensation
scheme.
Specifically, consider the following game. At the beginning of the game, the true
state is realized, but not revealed to anyone in the game. Then the pre-screening
stage begins. The principal announces the compensation scheme, which is designed
to screen the type of each applicant. Each expert, drawn from the population, applies
for the job positions and send a message t on his own type. In the employment stage,
the principal decides which applicants he will hire, based on the information he learns
from the pre-screening stage. Once hired, each expert submits his report on the true
state. Finally, the true state is revealed and payoffs are made according to the
compensation scheme.
The screening through compensation simplifies the optimization problem. After
the principal pre-screens experts, she knows the type of each applicant and how much
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she should pay if she hires some of them. Since experts hired are expected to submit
honest reports on the true state, the objective function of the principal becomes
a function of the precisions of employed experts less the sum of their reservation
utilities. With the mean squared error specification of the revenue, for example, we












where I is the set of all applicants. Now, the optimization problem becomes
a combinatorial optimization, or a discrete portfolio problem, which is covered in
Chapter 2 of this dissertation.
1.6 Conclusion and Discussion
This paper studies issues involving a principal wishing to hire possibly multiple ex-
perts for advice. To aggregate information from multiple sources and pay minimum
amount to each type of expert, the principal needs to design a mechanism induces
truthful type revelation and honest reporting on the true state. Under a Gaussian
specification, it is shown that there exists a payoff function which achieves this first-
best outcome. In the optimal contract proposed, the penalty for incorrect report is
increasing in type (precision) revealed by experts, preventing less precise experts to
hide behind more precise experts.
We derive the optimal compensation scheme in the class of linear functions in a
specified performance measure. We show that if the reservation utility is convex, the
first-best outcome is achieved with a payoff function linear in mean squared error. In
the case with concave reservation utility, the performance measure should be more
sensitive to the ex-post error, but still we can design the payoff function which is
linear in the power of mean squared error.
In the paper, we assume each expert’s gain from providing information depends
only on the current period compensation paid by the principal, and his ability is
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elicited through it. However, from a dynamic perspective, the ability or precision of
each agent may be evaluated by two parties: the decision maker (the principal) and
the outside evaluator (the market). In this case, the gain from information provisions
would come, at least partly, from future payoffs which depend on the reputation
built on today. Recent empirical studies show that career concerns matter in expert
advising. Ottaviani and Sørenson (2006a, 2006b) explore the theoretical approaches
on this topic.
However, Ottaviani and Sørenson (2006a) assume the compensation is solely de-
termined by reputation. In this sense, the approach of the paper is in the opposite
direction to ours. It would be a complete theory only when we consider the com-
pensation determined by both factors: future payoff from reputation and current
payoff from compensation. As two parties are involved in evaluation, there would be
a conflict of interests between the decision maker and the evaluator. Since the report
tends to be shaded or biased in the presence of reputation concerns, the principal’s




Getting Advice from Experts: Optimal
Employment
2.1 Introduction
People seek advice from better informed people, or experts. Corporate CEOs often
make decisions based on reports submitted by informed employees or sometimes from
outside consultants. Governments operate and/or keep close contact with research
institutes whose main objective is to advise clients of policies based on correct and
accurate information. Stock market analysts help traders make best decisions by
enlarging their information. In every situation mentioned above, the decision maker
may need advice from more than one expert.
This chapter1 explores the optimal employment when a monopolistic information
demander, a principal, wishes to gather information from multiple experts. We as-
sume each expert has heterogeneous information quality, or precision of the signal,
and his reservation wage depends on the quality. When the information quality is
known to the principal, his objective is to select the set of experts which provides the
best information.
Even when the information qualities are private, the principal needs to elicit
them to achieve the efficient information aggregation and minimal type dependent
wage payment. In Chapter 1, we show that there exist compensation schemes with
which the principal can screen the precision of each expert’s signal and pays only the
1This chapter represents joint work with Jooyong Jun.
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reservation utility. Through the proposed compensation scheme as a pre-screening
device, the employment problem the principal faces becomes the same as one under
full information on the precision.
We assume the principal’s objective is to minimize the expected mean squared
error of her own prediction on the true state less the wage payments. Under the
Gaussian specification, the expected mean squared error is the principal’s posterior
variance, or the reciprocal of the posterior precision. The objective function of the
principal’s optimization problem is the set function, but with the assumptions and
specifications of the model, it is transformed to the function of the sum of precisions.
With the nonlinear objective function and an arbitrary reservation utility func-
tion, it is hard to characterize the optimal employment set in general. We could,
however, find interesting results under a specification on reservation utility. When
the reservation utility is proportional to the marginal single information contribution,
we show that the optimal employment set satisfies a cut-off property where experts
with higher precision are hired. This strong result is derived because the marginal
information contribution function becomes less concave than the reservation wage
function as information is accumulated. We also discuss the case in which the cut-
off rule does not hold, and relate the problem with the ‘combinatorial optimization
problem,’ recently introduced to literature in economics.
As far as we know, there has been no paper which studies multiple experts and
associated employment decision problem. However, the problem is analogous to the
newly developed combinatorial optimization technique. In economics, Kelso and
Crawford (1982) pioneered the technique, first introducing the ‘gross substitutes con-
dition’ which guarantees a greedy algorithm to be optimal. The technique has since
been used in cooperative game theory, matching models, and multi-item auctions.
For recent literature, refer to Gul and Stacchetti (1999) which develops equivalent
conditions with gross substitute condition and relates it to the Walrasian equilibrium,
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Lehmann et. al. (2006) and Milgrom and Strulovici (2006) for auctions, and Chade
and Smith (2005) which develops a greedy algorithm to solve a simultaneous search
problem with single stochastic prize without gross substitutes condition.
This chapter is organized as follows: We describe the model and present the
optimization problem in the next section. In section 3, we present the main result:
under a specification of the reservation utility function, we derive the property of the
optimal employment set. Section 4 generalizes the result and propose the conditions
under which the main result holds. Section 5 relates the result with the recent
literature on combinatorial optimization. Section 5 concludes and addresses issues
for further research.
2.2 Model
An uninformed principal tries to make the best prediction of the true state, for
example the profitability of a project. To get better information beyond common
prior, the principal wishes to hire privately informed agents, who are called ‘experts’
hereafter. Experts are heterogeneous in the precision of their private signals on the
true state, which is labelled their type.
The true state x is drawn from a normal distribution with mean µx and variance
1/τx, which is common knowledge. We assume the true state is verifiable and thus
contractible. While the principal has no private information, expert i ∈ I receives a
conditionally independent private signal si, where I is the set of experts who applied
for the job positions. The distribution of si is assumed to follow a normal distribution
with mean x and precision τi, or
si = x + εi, εi ∼ N (0, 1/τi) .
The precision, or type, of each expert τi is drawn from the population with dis-
tribution function F on the support of [τ , τ ] ⊂ R+. We assume F is continuously
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differentiable so that the probability continuous density function f exists. The type
of each expert is assumed to be either common knowledge, or known to the principal
through costless pre-screening before the principal makes the employment decision.
Once hired, each expert should submit a report on the true state, denoted by
ri ∈ R for expert i. We assume the compensation scheme is designed for each expert
to report his posterior mean. In other words, the honest report is a priori assumed.
Since the principal knows the precision of each expert, the honest report on the true
state is equivalent to the honest report on the signal received. Formally, we have the
one-to-one relationship between the private signal and the honest report:
si =
(τx + τi)ri − τxµx
τi
Experts are assumed to be risk neutral utility maximizers with the identical
vNM utility function u(c) = c. Each expert has a reservation utility which is type-
dependent. With risk neutrality, the reservation utility can be seen as the reservation
wage. The reservation wage, or the outside option might be from the experts’ labor
market, or from the single production through the private information. We focus
on the second interpretation, noting that the principal is a monopolistic information
demander. We will discuss the first interpretation in later section. Type-dependent
reservation utility function u(τ) is assumed to be strictly increasing and continuously
differentiable.
The principal’s objective is to maximize revenue less payoffs to employed experts.
The revenue function R depends on the principal’s prediction on the true state,
denoted by x̂, and the true state. We specify it as R(x, x̂) ≡ K − a(x̂ − x)2 for
constants K > 0 and a > 0. I.e., the principal tries to minimize the mean squared
error2.
2The qualitative results of this chapter hold provided the principal minimizes any power function
of ex-post error, | x̂− x |. This is because the expectation of the power of error is a constant times
the power of the posterior variance. One can easily transform the optimization problem into one
with the mean squared error.
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With known precisions and honest reports, the principal’s best prediction is the
posterior mean of the true state given all information available for her. If J ⊂ I is
the employment set, we have
x̂ =
∑
j∈J rj(tj + τx)− (|J | − 1)µxτx∑
j∈J tj + τx
,
This prediction is unbiased, so the expected mean squared error becomes the posterior
variance, τx +
∑
j∈J τj. Principal’s objective is to select the best subset S ⊂ I which




















In principle, the problem can be solved through computing values of the objec-
tive function over the power set of alternatives (in our setting over the power set of
applicants). It belongs to the class of combinatorial optimization problems, which
aims at finding the best subset from a finite set of alternatives. Indeed, the optimiza-
tion problem is a special case of a firm’s employment decision problem in Kelso and
Crawford (1982) even though the focus is quite different from ours.3
In our model, we can consider the expected information gain of the principal as a
joint production by employed experts. As will be shown in the next section, the joint
production set function is submodular with respect to the set inclusion operation.
This implies that the production function exhibits the decreasing marginal returns:
the marginal contribution by a single agent to a subset of alternatives decreases as
the subset becomes larger. Though the submodularity is a nice property for the
objective function in maximization problems, it does not guarantee that we have a
simple algorithm to get the solution. Indeed, it is well known that the maximization
3The utility maximization problem given a price vector in Gull and Stacchetti (1999) is also
isomorphic to ours, where the utility and the price are analogue to the information gain and the
reservation wage, respectively.
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of a general submodular set function is computationally intractable4. This makes it
difficult not only to find the efficient algorithm but also to characterize the property
of the optimal set.
Nonetheless, the objective function of our model has a nice feature. Any set of
experts can be characterized by a single real number, the sum of precisions of experts
in the set. This allows us to transform the objective set function to a function on the
two dimensional Euclidian space. This transformation allows us to solve the problem
through a greedy algorithm, as will be discussed later.
Yet the optimal employment set is quite arbitrary since it depends heavily on the
form of reservation utility function. We make a critical but reasonable assumption
on the reservation utility in the next section: the reservation utility is proportional to
the marginal single information contribution. Under this specification, the optimal
employment set is shown to follow a cut-off property. We then discuss on general
cases, providing an example of complicated optimal employment set. The comparison
of our model and other combinatorial optimization problem is presented in the final
subsection.
2.3 Properties of Optimal Employment Set
Before we begin the analysis, we define some functions for notational convenience.
Definition 2.3.1: (Objective function)
1) A set function g, called information gain function hereafter, is a mapping from the
power set of I to R+, which is defined as




, S ⊂ I.
4In the combinatorial optimization problem theory, the problem is known to be so called NP-
hard: there is no algorithm for the problem to be solved in a polynomial time. See, for example,
Lovàsz (1982).
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If S is a singleton, g(S) is called a single information gain function. We abuse notation
by denoting g(i) = g({i}) for i ∈ I.
2) We call f the information contribution (IC) function, denoted by f(TS) where T is
the sum of the precisions in the set S ⊂ I5;
f(T ) ≡ K − a
T
.
Note that T ∈ [τx, τx + ∑i∈I τi].
3) The marginal information contribution (MIC) function is derived from information
contribution function. For prior T and precision of a new signal τ , we let
M (T, τ) ≡ f(T + τ)− f(T ) = aτ
T (T + τ)
.
Similarly we define the information loss when we remove a signal with precision τ
from a set whose precision is T .
O(T, τ) ≡ f(T )− f(T − τ) = aτ
T (T − τ) .
We have the following properties of the information contribution function.
Lemma 2.1: (Properties of IC function)
(a) (Monotonicity of information gain function) For any A ⊂ B ⊂ I, g(A) ≤ g(B).
(b) (Monotonicity of information contribution function) f(T ) is increasing in T .
(c) (Submodularity of information gain function) For any A and B in 2I , we have
g(A) + g(B) ≥ g(A ∪B) + g(A ∩B).
(d) (Concavity of IC function) For any τ1 > τ2 and for any T1 > T2, the inequality
f(T1 + τ1)− f(T1 + τ2) < f(T2 + τ1)− f(T2 + τ2) is satisfied.
5We sometimes suppress S.
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Proof. It is easy to show that (a) and (b) are equivalent and (c) and (d) are
equivalent. (b) is obvious by definition. To see (c) holds, it suffices to show that




































We now make a critical assumption on the reservation utility. We assume that it
is proportional to the marginal single information contribution6, that is, for k > 1,
u(τ) ≡ 1
k




We also normalize a = τx = 1. The assumption is quite strict but reasonable.
It says that if the expert utilizes his private information outside of the relationship
with the principal, his gain is proportional to the marginal single information gain.
Behind the assumption we think all potential principals in the market share the same
information on each expert so that the gain inside of the market should be the same
across principals. Since all employers do not know who is what type, the reservation
utility cannot be type dependent. The only situation where an expert with higher
ability gains more lies in the case when he uses the private information for his own
gain.
To prove the key characterization of the optimal employment set, we need the
following lemma:
6We strongly conjecture that the main result still hold if the reservation utility is a concave
function of the marginal single information contribution. This is because, as will be clarified later,
the main result depends on the fact that the marginal contribution function near the global opti-
mum crosses the reservation utility only once and from below. The fact is still satisfied when the
reservation utility is concave in the marginal single contribution.
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Lemma 2.2: The net information gain from adding τ from a set with collective
precision T , M (T, τ) − u(τ) crosses zero on τ > 0 at most once and from below.
Likewise, the net information gain from dropping τ , u(τ) − O(T, τ) crosses zero at
most once and from above.
Proof. M (T, τ) − u(τ) > 0 if and only if T (T + τ) − k(1 + τ) < 0. Since it is
linear in τ , for some τ > 0 to satisfy the equality we must have either k − T 2 > 0
and T − k > 0 or k − T 2 < 0 and T < k. However, the latter inequality cannot
hold because k > 1. Thus, we need to check only the case of
√
k < T < k. Then,
T (T + τ) − k(1 + τ) is a decreasing function of τ and crosses zero only once rom
above. This implies that M (T, τ)− u(τ) crosses zero at most once from below.
For the dropping case, u(τ) − O(T, τ) > 0 if and only if (T + k)τ − T 2 + k < 0.
This crosses zero at most once regardless of the value of T . Since it crosses from
below, u(τ)− O(T, τ) crosses from above.
The intuition of Lemma 2 is as follows. For the marginal information contribution
function to cross the reservation utility function, T must be in an appropriate range.
Since the MIC becomes less concave as T increases, it is flat relative to the reservation
wage function in the range of T .
We need an additional lemma to prove the main proposition.
Lemma 2.3: Suppose that T 2 > k. Let τ2 satisfy M (T, τ) − u(τ) = 0 and τ1
satisfy u(τ)− O(T, τ) = 0. Then, τ1 < τ2.
Proof. The existences of τ1 and τ2 are immediate from the proof of lemma 2. We
have (T−k)τ2+T 2−k = 0 and (T +k)τ1−T 2+k = 0. But then, (T +k)τ2−T 2+k >
−(T − k)τ2 = T 2 − k. Thus, u(τ2)− O(T, τ1) < 0, which implies that τ1 < τ2
Proposition 2.1: Under the current reservation utility specification, the optimal
employment set follows the cut-off property. That is, there exists τ ∗ such that experts











Figure 2.1: Marginal Gain from Adding/Dropping an Expert with τ (k = 4, T = 3)
Proof. Let S ⊂ I be the optimal set and let TS be the associated collective
precision. Note first that if T 2S < k, S cannot be the optimum unless S = I since
adding any expert in I \S yields positive net gain. We only consider the case T 2S > k.
Define τ1 and τ2 as in the proof of lemma 3. Suppose s ∈ S is less than τ1.
Then, dropping it improves net gain, contradicting the optimality. Similarly, any
u ∈ I \ S cannot be bigger than τ2. The only thing we need to check is the case in
which there are i and j such that both are between τ1 and τ2, τi < τj, and τi ∈ S but
τj ∈ I \S. Consider S \{τi, τj}. The optimality implies that M (TS−τi, τi)−u(τi) >M
(TS − τi, τj) − u(τj). But then M (T − τi, τ) − u(τ) crosses zero from above, which
contradicts Lemma 2. (Refer to Figure 1) This completes the proof.
It should be noticed that the cut-off property is a property of the optimal em-
ployment set, not a decision rule. A decision rule is a method to find the optimal
set given the knowledge of the applicants’ types from the pre-screening stage. Even
though the cut-off type τ ∗ depends on the types of applicants, it does not mean that
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we can specify a decision rule as a function τ ∗(τ1, · · · , τ|I|).
However, the cut-off property suggests a simple algorithm work to find the optimal
set. We propose two algorithms. The first one is the Marginal Improvement Algorithm
(MIA), as in Chade and Smith (2005). The principal begins with the null set and
search the best expert and add him into the employment set. She searches the best
expert given the current employment set (and thus the current T ) among experts not
in the employment set. She repeats this procedure until the marginal net information
gain is negative. The second algorithm is as follows. The principal first sorts the
applicants by type, then begins checking starting with the highest type of applicant.
She adds the applicant to the employment set as long as the marginal net gain is
positive. After all, she hires all applicants before the applicant whose marginal net
gain is negative. Both algorithms solve the problem in O(|I|2), steps but they are
different in orders of experts added to the employment set.
The following example shows the optimal employment set when |I| = 2.
Example 2.1: Consider the two applicants case: |I| = 2. Let a = 1, tx = 1, and
ti ∈ (0, 2]. Also, assume that the reservation utility for the expert with type τ is half




(g({τ})− g(∅)) = τ
2τx(τx + τ)
.










Figure 2.2: Optimal Employment Set for Two Applicants
Area Net Gain for the Principal
A {1, 2} Â {1} Â {2}
B {1, 2} Â {2} Â {1}
C {2} Â {1, 2} Â {1}
D {2} Â {1} Â {1, 2}
E {1} Â {1, 2} Â {2}
F {1} Â {2} Â {1, 2}
We can easily check the monotonicity of the optimal employment set: there is
no case in which the higher type is not employed while the lower type is. This is
equivalent to the cut-off property of the optimal set. It shows also that both applicants
are hired together only when they are all of low type.
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2.4 Discussion on the Specification
2.4.1 Other Reservation Utility Specification
In the previous section, we show a nice property for the optimal employment set. The
result crucially depends on the quasi-convexity of the marginal net information gain,
which is due to the fact that, roughly speaking, the marginal information contribu-
tion is less convex than the reservation wage. Moreover, the marginal information
contribution becomes less concave as T gets large. This implies that even though
the marginal information contribution is more concave than reservation utility at the
initial state (when T = τ), it might become less concave when T approaches the op-
timal cut-off point. The specification of reservation utility in the previous subsection
shows exactly this case. Initially, the curvature of the reservation utility is the same
as that of the marginal information contribution. For T > τx, however, the curvature
of the former is always bigger than the latter.
Though the assumption on reservation utility in the previous subsection is rea-
sonable, there are other possibilities where the property we discussed above does not
hold. To motivate, we provide an example in which the simple greedy algorithm
described above fails to lead to the optimum.
Example 2.2: Figure 3 shows a linear reservation utility function u(τ) = 1
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τ
and marginal information contribution functions when a = 1, T being varied. Let
τx = 1, and the support of τ is (0, 3]. Note first that when the principal is to hire
only one expert, the highest type is always preferred since M (1, τ) ≡ f(1, τ)− u(τ) is
increasing when τ ≤ 3.
Suppose three applicants have applied for the job and from the pre-screening the
principal knows their types are τ1 = 1, τ2 = 2, and τ3 = 2.8. The global optimum
is to hire expert 1 and expert 2. However, if the principal solves locally, he will first









Figure 2.3: Marginal Information Gain and Reservation Utility
(Failure of MIA)
Consider now three applicants of type τ1 = 1, τ2 = 1.5, and τ3 = 2. The global
optimum is to hire expert 1 and expert 3. (Failure of monotonicity)
The above example shows that the marginal improvement algorithm does not
lead to the global optimal solution7, and the optimal employment set may be non-
monotonic. The key point in this example is the quasi-concavity of the marginal net
gain. As the reservation utility function is close to linear, the marginal net gain is
always more concave than the reservation utility function. If the reservation utility is
linear or convex, the marginal net gain is always concave due to the submodularity of
f . This implies that as the employment set is enlarged, or equivalently the information
is cumulated, the lower type has a better chance of being hired than the higher type,
though initially the higher type contributes more. This breaks down the monotonicity
and the MIA may not lead to the global optimum.
7This does not mean that no greedy algorithm solves the problem. Greedy algorithm is a broader
concept than MIA. It is, roughly speaking, a way to find the global optimal solution to a discrete
optimization problem through finding local optima in each step. If such algorithm leads to the global
optima, it reduces calculation time dramatically (from an exponential time to a polynomial time.)
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2.4.2 General Conditions for the Cut-off Property
As we discussed in the previous section, the cut off property crucially depends on
the fact that, near the global optimum, marginal information contribution crosses
the reservation utility only once and from below. One may ask the general condition
for the objective function under which the property holds. This subsection shows
the single crossing property holds when the objective function satisfies the decreasing
curvature property. This type of function is referred to as DARA for utility functions.
We define this property in terms of discrete choices.
Definition 2.4.1: A set function f on 2S, where S = {s1, . . . sn}, is said to
satisfy decreasing curvature (DC, hereafter) if for a given , if for all i = 1, 2, · · · , n−2,
−f(si)− 2f(si+1) + f(si+2)
f(si)− f(si+1)
is decreasing in i.
We first assume that the objective function f is a set function defined on 2E where
E is a finite set, and there exists a complete order among elements in E with respect
to a binary relationship º. Suppose, as in the main model, that the reservation
utility u is proportional to the individual’s single production, or u(a) = αf(a) where
0 < α < 1. Assume f(∅) = 0 so that the marginal single production is the single
production. Then, for a set of applicants A, the maximum profit is f(A)−α ∑e∈A f(e).
The positive single crossing condition is satisfied if there exists a∗ ∈ S such that






then, for any b < a∗ and b /∈ A,






and for any b 4 a∗,








Because f is an increasing, submodular set function, if the positive single crossing
condition is satisfied, then for a subset A′ ⊇ A, if there exists b∗ such that for any
b < b∗,
f(b ∪ A′)− αf(b) ≥ α ∑
e∈A′
f(e)
is satisfied, we have b∗ < a∗.
The following proposition states that the positive single crossing condition is sat-
isfied if the submodular production function shows a decreasing curvature and the
reservation utility is given as a fraction of single production.
Proposition 2.2: For an increasing submodular set function f (·) and a subset
A ∈ 2S, if the reservation utility is given as a fraction of single production, or u(s) =
αf(s) where s ∈ S, f(·) satisfies the positive single crossing condition if f(·) satisfies
decreasing curvature.
Proof. First, we explain the decreasing absolute risk averse property, a decreasing
curvature, of a set function with a complete subset order for its domain. It also leads
that if a non-empty subset A does not include si, si+1, nor si+2, then the inequality
−f(si ∪ A)− 2f(si+1 ∪ A) + f(si+2 ∪ A)
f(si ∪ A)− f(si+1 ∪ A) < −
f(si)− 2f(si+1) + f(si+2)
f(si)− f(si+1)
is satisfied.
If there exists such n∗, the inequality
f(sn ∪ A)− f(sn∗ ∪ A) ≥ αf(sn)− αf(sn∗) (2.2)
needs to be satisfied. From DC property, the following inequality
0 > f(sn ∪A)− 2f(sn+1 ∪A) + f(sn+2 ∪A) > α(f(sn)− 2f(sn+1) + f(sn+2)) (2.3)
is satisfied, which implies that the decrease of production difference is slower than
the decrease of reservation utility difference and, therefore, for any sn < sn∗ (or
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If (2.2) is violated, from decreasing curvature, the decrease of reservation utility
difference is slower than the decrease of production difference, which leads to the
violation of (2.3). Then, there may exists s∗ such that any sn such that sn < s∗ < sn∗






≥ 0, which contradicts the
definition of n∗.






< 0 for all sn ≺ sn∗ .














0. Then, we have the following inequality f(s′′ ∪ A) − αf(s′′) < f(s′ ∪ A) − αf(s′)
which clearly violates (2.2) and from decreasing curvature, no s Â s′ satisfies the






≥ 0 . This result, however, clearly violate
the assumption sn∗ Â s′. This completes the proof.
2.5 Efficient Algorithm
2.5.1 Gross Substitute and Efficient Algorithm
In an analysis of labor market equilibrium, Kelso and Crawford (1982) introduce
the Gross Substitutes (GS) condition to show the existence and the stability of the
equilibrium. Gul and Stacchetti (1999), in a slightly different setting, also consider
the objective set function satisfying GS condition in addition to a new condition of a
set function, the Single Improvement (SI) property. Though focuses of their papers
are on the existence of market equilibrium, not on the optimal decision itself as ours,
their results provide some implications for our model. The following definitions are
ones slightly modified from Gul and Stacchetti (1999).
Definition 2.5.1: Denote S(w) be the optimal set of the optimization problem.
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A function f : 2I → R
(i) satisfies the GS condition if for any two reservation wage vectors w1 and w2 in
[w,w]I such that w1 ≤ w2, and any A ∈ S(w1), there exists B ∈ S(w2) such that
{i ∈ A|w1i = w2i } ⊂ B.
(ii) has the SI property if for any reservation wage vector w in [w, w]I and set of employees
A /∈ S(w), there exists a bundle B such that g(A)−∑j∈A wj < g(B)−
∑
j∈B wj and
|A \B| ≤ 1, and |B \ A| ≤ 1.
Gul and Stacchetti (1999) show that if f is monotone then the GS condition is
equivalent to the SI condition. Chade and Smith (2006) states in the appendix that
the SI condition, or equivalently M \-concavity from Murota and Shioura (2003),
guarantees that a greedy algorithm leads to the global optima. The greedy algorithm
using SI condition, which is called the steepest ascent algorithm (SAA), can be roughly
as follows. Start with an arbitrary subset of the whole set. If the set is locally optimal,
then stop. Otherwise, add or subtract a single element to/from the subset or replace
one element in the set with an element from outside, which improves the objective in
the best way. Repeat this procedure until we reach the local optimum.
MIA is a special case of the SAA in that the procedure does not contain a sub-
straction nor a replacement in each local step. It solves the problem more efficiently
than the SAA, but it is not guaranteed for the algorithm to lead the global optima
even in the case when the objective function satisfies the SI condition. However,
Proposition 3 implies that the principal in our model can solve the problem through
the MIA, thus through the SAA.
In fact, the SI property holds for the objective function in our model since given
a set of applicants, one can find the best among the applicants outside of the set
and/or the worst among those inside the set, which is illustrated in Figure 1. This
can be generalized even further. Once the objective function is a function of the sum
of types of a subset, that is, if the set function can be transformed to a function whose
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domain is a Euclidean space, the SI property always holds for the objective function.
The SI property of the objective function in our model provides a weak com-
parative statics result. Due to the equivalence of the GS and SI conditions, the
information gain function satisfies the GS condition. This implies that an increase
in reservation wages for part of the applicant pool does not affect the employment
decision on applicants whose reservation wages do not change.
2.5.2 Efficient Algorithm for a Submodular Set function
In the main model of this chapter, we consider a specific set function where it is a
reciprocal of the sum of elements. This subsection considers the optimization of a
general submodular set function. Though myopic local search does not lead to the
global optima, we propose an algorithm from some properties of the submodular set
function which reduces the calculation time.
Let Sn := {s1, . . . , sn}, and Sn+1 := Sn ∪{sn+1} for a given set of N applicants I.
For sets A,B, and C, define [A,B,C] ≡ (A\B) ∪ C.
The following lemma states that once an element x ∈ S is not included in the
optimal subset of one set, x is not included in the optimal subset of any bigger set
including the original set. It is a critical property which is used for the employment
algorithm later.
Lemma 2.4: If τ ∈ Sn and τ /∈ An, then for any Sm such that Sn ⊂ Sm ⊆ S (or
for any m > n), τ /∈ Am.
Proof. It is obvious that you cannot be better off by removing any element
from an optimal subset or including any other element into it. In other words, for
any τ ∈ An, where An is the optimal subset for a given Sn ⊆ S, the inequality
f(An\{τ}) ≤ f(An) − u(τ) must be satisfied, and for any a /∈ An, f(An\{a}) ≥
f(An)− u(a). We also know that f(An) ≤ f(Am).
Suppose there exists an element τ /∈ An but τ ∈ Am. Then the inequalities
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f(An∪{τ})− u(τ) < f(An) and f(Am\{τ}) < f(Am)−u(τ) must be satisfied. From
these inequalities, we know that f(An ∪ {τ}) + f(Am\{τ}) < f(An) + f(Am) must
be satisfied, which contradicts the submodularity assumption. Therefore, if τ /∈ An,
then τ /∈ Am.
The following lemma states that if including an additional element leads to the
better payoff but not to an optimum, exchaging an element will do so.
Lemma 2.5: If f(An ∪{sn+1})−u(sn+1) > f(An) and An+1 6= An ∪{sn+1}, then
there exists a unique a ∈ An which satisfies An+1 = [An, {a}, {sn+1}].
Proof. Note that Sn+1\Sn = {sn+1}. Lemma 1 implies that any element not in
An cannot be included in An+1. Therefore, including any element x /∈ An ∪ {sn+1}
does not leads to An+1. Therfore, there exists at least one a ∈ An such that f(An ∪
{sn+1}) − u(a) ≤ f([An, {a}, {sn+1}]) and the additional gain from hiring sn+1 is
strictly positive.
Now we check uniqueness. Because a < τn+1, the following inequality
f([An, {a}, {τn+1}]) ≤ f(An)
must be satisfied, which also implies that [An, {a}, {τn+1}] 4 An. We already know
that for any τ ∈ An, the following inequality f(An)− u(τ) ≥ f(An\{τ}) is satisfied.
Therefore, with Assumption 1, the following inequality
f([An, {a}, {τn+1}])− f([An, {a}, {τn+1}]\{τ}) ≥ f(An)− f(An\{τ})
is satisfied for any τ ∈ [An, {a}, {τn+1}].
Suppose now that there exists another element a′ ∈ An and a′ 6= a which satisfies
f ([An, {a}, {τn+1}])−u(a′) ≤ f ([An, {a}, {τn+1}]\{a′}). Then, from f(An)−u(a′) ≥
f(An\{a′}), f ([An, {a}, {τn+1}]) + f(An\{a′}) ≤ f(An) + f ([An, {a}, {τn+1}]\{a′})
must be satisfied, which violates the submodularity assumption. Therefore, for any
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τ ∈ [An, {a}, {τn+1}], the following inequality
f([An, {a}, {τn+1}])− u(τ) > f([An, {a}, {τn+1}]\{τ})
is always satisfied, which implies that there is no element to be removed other than
a. Therefore, only one element in An needs to be removed to reach the new optimal
subset An+1 if An ∪ {sn+1} 6= An+1.
Here is the optimal algorithm of simultaneous hiring:
Proposition 2.3: The following algorithm finds the global optimum.
(a) Sort the N applicants by the decreasing order of capability.
(b) If f(An ∪ {τn+1}) − u(τn+1) < f(An), then set An+1 = An and move on to the
next applicant.
(c) Otherwise, if f(An ∪ {τn+1}) − u(τn+1) > f(An), then find a ∈ An which
minimizes f(An ∪ {τn+1}) − f([An, {a}, {τn+1}]) − u(a). If this value is pos-
itive, then set An+1 = An ∪ {τn+1}. If this value is negative, then set An+1 =
[An, {a}, {τn+1}].
(d) Repeat 2-3 until reaching the final applicant.
2.6 Conclusion and Discussion
This paper studies issues involving a principal wishing to hire possibly multiple
experts for advice. Based on the result in the pre-screening stage, we examine the
optimal employment decision. We show that under a realistic specification on the
reservation utility, a cut-off rule employment policy is optimal. We also provide an
example in which the monotonicity and the marginal improvement algorithm break
down. It turns out that the property of the optimal employment set crucially depends
on the relative concavity of the marginal information gain to the reservation utility.
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In general, it can be shown that if the production function is a function of the sum
of the types of employees, and it is submodular in set inclusion operation, then the
production would exhibit decreasing marginal returns as shown in Gul and Stacchetti
(1999). Then the optimal employment policy depends on the relative concavity of
the marginal gain to the reservation utility, or quasi-convexity (quasi-concavity) of
the marginal net gain. We raise two issues: what the characteristics of the optimal
employment set are, and whether we can find a greedy algorithm in which local search
leads to the global optimum. We leave these topics for future research.
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Chapter 3
Uncertain Arrival Timing of a Signal and
Forecasting Behavior
3.1 Introduction
Consider a forecaster who wishes to predict a firm’s earnings. He has heard news from
an insider which is informative for the forecasting. He also observes other forecasters’
forecasts from which she may get some information on the earnings. He should now
figure out whether the news has already been incorporated in the previous forecasts,
since otherwise he may doubly count the same information.
This paper presents a parsimonious forecasting model to examine the effect of
a common signal on the forecast when the arrival time of the signal is uncertain.
We are in particular interested in the Bayesian updating procedure through which
the forecaster fully utilizes the information contained in the consensus from past
forecasters and the new signal. We then examine the empirical implication of the
model.
Most literature on this topic, both in empirical and in theoretical studies, assumes
a simple information structure in which every private signal is long-lived, and all
public information is contained in the prior. On the contrary, some information in
real world is short-lived, and shared by forecasters.1
This chapter examines another type of information. A signal is issued at some
1Even in the case where private signals are short-lived, if successors know who among predecessors
have the signal and when it gets revealed, the outcome is equivalent to the assumption of a long-lived
private signal.
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point in time, but forecasters who receive it do not know when it is issued. Examples
include leaked information from insiders, informative rumors, and public information
transmitted slowly. In the model we present, the consensus may already reflect the
new signal. Facing this uncertainty, the forecaster needs to estimate the chance that
his information has been stale. This estimation procedure affects the estimate of the
true state.
Under a Gaussian specification, it is shown that the forecaster’s weight on his own
information increases in the gap between his own information (the new signal) and
the consensus. This is because, as the private signal of the forecaster moves out from
the consensus, he believes his signal is more likely to be new. As a result, the forecast
is more dispersed compared to the case with certain arrival timing.
The result sheds light on recent empirical studies on herding/anti-herding bias in
earnings’ forecasts. Chen and Jiang (2006) and Bernhardt et al. (2006) show that
forecasters tend to anti-herd in the sense that they assign more weight on the pri-
vate information than on the public information, or consensus, compared to rational
Bayesian updating. Since the private information is not observable, they use the fact
that the expected forecast error is uncorrelated with deviation from the consensus.
In other words, the forecast error should not be predictable by available information.
Without resorting to behavioral assumption or strategic behavior due to certain
features of the payoff, this paper shows that statisticians observe forecasters to weight
more on private information rather than the consensus. This is contrary to the
argument in Bernhardt et al. (2006) that their result is not affected by variations in
the information structure.
The article is organized as follows. We present our model in the next section.
We then analyze the Bayesian updating procedure for the forecaster and derive the
properties of the forecasts. The empirical implications are proposed in the following
section. In the last section, we discuss a few related issues and conclude.
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3.2 Model
A forecaster tries to give her best forecast on the true state x. We call her the
forecaster to distinguish her from past forecasters. A priori the true state is assumed
to follow normal distribution with mean µx and precision τx, i.e., x ∼ N (µx, 1/τx).
We assume this prior mean µx is unknown to the forecaster, but τx is known. This is
critical assumption for the main model. Instead, she observes a consensus from past
forecasters. We denote the consensus by c.2 The distribution of the consensus will
be discussed later.
The forecaster observes an informative signal s and it is the sum of the true state
and the error term where the error term is independent to the true state.3 Formally,
we have
s = x + εs, εs ∼ N (0, 1/τs)
The consensus can be interpreted as the aggregate information from past fore-
casters. In the perspective of the forecaster, the consensus c is the prior information
available. The consensus provides information on true state, but the forecaster does
not know whether it already contains the information from the signal she has ob-
served. This is the case when the signal has arrived before the consensus is made, or
before the current forecaster’s turn.
To model this environment, we assume there are two events about the arrival time
of the new signal, which is represented by a random variable t ∈ {0, 1}. If t = 0, the
signal is arrived in the past and the signal is incorporated in the consensus. If t = 1,
it is new to the forecaster. The ex-ante probability of the former event is 1 − p for
p ∈ (0, 1).
The observed consensus c now depends on whether the signal s has been arrived
2We slightly abuse notations to denote by c both the random variable and a realization of it.
3In principle, we need to assume the forecaster receives her own pure private information. We
ignore this private information to focus only on the effect of common signal.
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before the forecaster or he is the first forecaster who observes it. When t = 1, it is

















Note that µx is unknown, which implies that observing s does not guarantee the
forecaster knows the arrival timing of the signal.
After observing c and s, the forecaster should submit her forecast on the true state.
It is assumed the compensation is decreasing in the ex-post mean squared error and
it is paid when the true state is realized. Thus, it is optimal for the forecaster to
submit the posterior mean of the true state given all information available to him.
We now consider the optimal forecast by a Bayesian rational forecaster.
3.3 Bayesian Update and Optimal Forecast
As a benchmark, suppose first that there is no uncertainty in t, i.e., the forecaster
knows which event with respect to t has occurred. Then, if t = 0, the forecaster has
no additional information, and therefore her forecast would be
r = r0 ≡ c,
while if t = 1, since she knows the signal s should be used to update the forecast of
the true state, we have
r = r1 ≡ τxc + τss
τx + τs
Now, suppose that the event t is uncertain. Then, the forecaster needs to deter-
mine from which distribution the signal has been drawn. Let π be the posterior belief
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that t = 1. Then, for a K which depends on s and the belief on µx, we have
π
1− π =
Pr [t = 1 | c, s]
Pr [t = 0 | c, s]
=
f (c | t = 1, s) Pr [t = 1]









This results in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1: Keeping K constant, the posterior belief on t = 1 is increasing in
| s− c |.
Proof. The likelihood ratio increases in | s− c |, and so does the probability.
The result is intuitive. The forecaster knows that the consensus is the mean of
the true state conditional on the information past forecasters possess, which is the
weighted mean of the prior mean and the signals they receive. As we can see in Figure
3.1, if the signal s is observed by past forecasters, the consensus must be close to the
signal compared to the case without it regardless of the belief on µx. In other words,
the closer c is to s, it is more likely that the consensus contains information of the






Figure 3.1: The consensus and a signal
Proposition 3.1: For a fixed s, with uncertain timing, the forecaster weighs
more on the private signal as the signal moves away from the consensus.
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Proof. Note that
r = E[x | s, c] = Pr[t = 0 | s, c]E[x | s, c, t = 0] + Pr[t = 1 | s, c]E[x | s, c, t = 1]
= πr1 + (1− π)r0
This implies that as s deviates farther from the consensus, the forecaster weight more
on r1, resulting in more weight on s.
3.4 Forecasting Error and Anti-Herding
In recent empirical studies, Zitzewitz, Eric (2001), Bernhardt et al. (2006), and Chen
and Jiang (2006) argue that earnings’ forecasters exhibit anti-herding, rather than
herding that the previous literature had observed. They use the terminology anti-
herding in the sense that forecasters weight more on private information than on the
public information, or consensus, compared to the rational Bayesian updating. The
possible explanations on the anti-herding in the literature are i) behavioral forecasting
such as overconfident behavior, and ii) some payoff distortions which drive forecasters
to forecast more riskily. In this section, we argue that it is explained by the uncertain
arrival of some signals.
Bernhardt et al. (2006) base their argument on the fact that regardless of the
distribution of information, as long as the forecast is unbiased in the sense that
forecasters report their posterior mean or median, the probability that the realized
earning is bigger than the report should be half. Similarly, Chen and Jiang (2006)
examine the weight forecasters assign to private signal in an indirect way, and con-
clude that they assign more weight to private signal. In the following, we restate the
main empirical model in Chen and Jiang (2006) in terms of our model, and examine
the relationship between the forecasting error and the deviation from the consensus.4
4The probabilistic empirical model in Bernhardt et al. (2006) can be analyzed similarly. They
use the fact that when the state turns out to be above the prior mean, the honest forecast tends to
be lower than the realized value. In other words,
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Since the public and private information are not observable, Chen and Jiang
(2006) use the fact that, with the honest forecast on the true state, the expected
forecast error is uncorrelated with deviation from the consensus. In other words,
the forecasting error should not be predictable by available information.5 This logic
works for our model with certain timing. To see this, fix t = 1 and consider s as a
private signal. Let h be the weight on s in Bayesian update, k be the actual weight
on the signal in the actual forecast, and r be the actual forecast. In our model,
h = τs/(τx + τs). Then, if the forecast is the posterior mean of the true state,
E[x | c, s] = hs + (1− h)c.
But since r = ks + (1− k)c,
E[FE | c, s] = E[r − x | c, s] = k − h
k
(r − c) = β0Dev.
for a constant β0, or k = h. If the actual report is the posterior mean of the true
state, it must be that β0 = 0.
In our model, we assume the signal s could be either private or public. Nonethe-
less, if the timing is certain, the expected forecast error is uncorrelated to the deviation
since without the private signal (t = 0) the deviation is zero. We now consider the
case of uncertain timing. The following proposition shows if the signal deviates from
the consensus far enough, then the expected forecast error is positively correlated
with the deviation.










However, this analysis is not valid if the prior mean is stochastic as is our model.
5Indeed, the expected forecasting error is uncorrelated with the forecast. In general, for the
optimal forecast ri by the forecaster with private signal si, we have
E [ri(si)Ex(ri(si)− x)] = E [E(x | si)E (E(x | si)− x)] = E [E(x | si)E (E(x | si)− x | si)] = 0
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Proposition 3.2: Suppose π > p (π < p). Then, the expected forecast error
given c and s is positively (negatively) correlated with the deviation from the consen-
sus.
Proof. The following calculations are straightforward.
E [r − x|c, s, t = 1] = πτxc + τss
τx + τs
+ (1− π)c− τxc + τss
τx + τs
= (1− π)τs(c− s)
τx + τs
,
E [r − x|c, s, t = 0] = πτxc + τss
τx + τs
+ (1− π)c− c = πτs(s− c)
τx + τs
.
The forecast error FE ≡ r − x is now in expectation,
E [FE | c, s] = pE [r − x|c, s, t = 1] + (1− p)E [r − x|c, s, t = 0]
= p(1− π)τs(c− s)
τx + τs











Therefore, the deviation of the forecast from the consensus, Dev ≡ r − c, follows




E [FE | c, s] = π − p
π
(r − c),
which completes the proof.
Proposition 3.2 shows that when the signal timing is uncertain, the forecast error
is not independent with the deviation from the consensus. The sign of the correlation
depends on the the relationship between the ex-ante and ex-post belief on the arrival
timing. Note that in the previous empirical literature, the positive correlation is
considered as an evidence of anti-herding. In our model, the statistician may observe
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either herding or anti-herding, depending on the realization of the consensus and
signal.
The result may be extended to the expected forecasting behavior, considering the
distribution of the signal and the belief on the prior mean. This is left for the future
research, but we can propose some conjecture here. Sine the ex-post belief increases
in the gap between the consensus and the signal, as the signal distribution has higher
variance or the consensus is less informative, it is more likely for the statistician to
observe anti-herding.
3.5 Conclusion and Discussion
In this chapter, we examine through a parsimonious model the effect of common
information on the forecast when the arrival timing of the information is uncertain.
We show that the posterior distribution of the arrival timing depends on the deviation
of the signal from the consensus. This implies that the optimal forecast also depends
on the deviation, which may result in the seemingly anti-herding behavior. The
result has an empirical implication: without resorting to the behavioral or payoff-
relevant distortion, we can observe that the expected forecast error may be positively
correlated with the deviation.
Though we explain the puzzle raised in recent empirical studies on anti-herding
behavior in earnings’ forecasts through a non-standard information structure, there
are other models consistent with the finding such as one with a behavioral approach
and one with non-standard payoff. Which model provides a more plausible explana-
tion would be an important and interesting empirical issue.
The generalization of the model is left for future research. The final goal of the
generalization would be explaining the time series properties of actions (buy/sell
decision, forecast, etc.) when public information arrives with stochastic timing. The
main issue here is how the learning procedure affects the assessment of the timing, and
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we believe that it would provide some empirical regularities such as the short-term
under-reaction and the long-term over-reaction to news event.6
6Short-term momentum and long-term mean reversion is a version of this regularity in the finan-
cial market. As far as we know, the only plausible model to explain this is through the behavioral




[1] Abrue, Dilip and Markus Brunnermeier (2002a), “Synchronization Risk and
Delayed Arbitrage,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 66.
[2] Abrue, Dilip and Markus Brunnermeier (2002b), “Bubble and Crashes,” Econo-
metrica, Vol. 71, No. 1.
[3] Avery, C. N. and J. A. Chevalier (1999), “Herding over the Career.” Economic
Letters, Vol. 63.
[4] Bernhardt, Dan, Murillo Campello, and Edward Kutsoati(2006), “Who Herds?”
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 80, No. 3.
[5] Bhattacharya, Sudipto and Paul Pfleiderer (1985), “Delegated Portfolio Man-
agement.” Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 36, No. 1.
[6] Brunnermeier, Markus (2005), “Information Leakage and Market Efficiency,”
Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 18, No. 2.
[7] Chade, Hector and Lones Smith (2005), “Simultaneous Search,” Mimeo.
[8] Chade, Hector and Lones Smith (2006), “Simultaneous Search,” Econometrica,
Vol. 74, No.5.
[9] Chen, Qi and Wei Jiang(2006), “Analysts’ Weighting of Private and Public
Information,” The Review of Financial Studies, vol. 19, no. 1.
[10] Chu, Jennifer(2005), Does Bayesian Updating Occur? Evidence from Analyst
Earnings Forecasts, mimeo
[11] Crawford, V. and Joel Sobel (1982), “Strategic Information Transmission.”
Ecoometrica, Vol. 50, No. 6.
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